An activist reviews the strategies and lessons learned from her organization's campaign against torture in Peru.

The National Human Rights Coordination is an umbrella organization that brings together 64 local, regional, and national civil organizations across the country. Our common mission is to develop a human rights culture through defending and promoting a human rights agenda.

Introduction: Torture in Peru

For twenty years, Peru lived in a climate of political violence that shook our lives at every level. The internal war had a death toll of 25,000. In this tense context, within the relationships among security forces, subversive groups, and citizens, many human rights violations occurred. For example, in the first 10 years, between 1980 and 1990 (the most violent phase) 4,000 disappearances were reported. In the 90's, under the regime of Alberto Fujimori — who is now a fugitive in Japan — the intensity of the violence decreased; however, the government created a powerful political, social, cultural, and military strategy to "pacify the country." This policy included, among others things, draconian antiterrorism legislation that sent thousands of innocent men and women to prison.

In this social and political environment, my organization, the National Human Rights Coordination (NHRC), decided in 1999 to publish the report An Analysis of Torture in Peru. With this document, the NHRC started a national campaign against torture using the strategies of prevention and public awareness with the ultimate goal of bringing an end to torture.

This report analyzed over 4,600 cases and complaints of torture, received between 1988 and 1998. Our report affirmed that torture is a systematic and widespread human rights violation in Peru and that the majority of the victims are the urban poor and peasants. Other torture victims included suspects of terrorism, innocent children, young people involved in the mandatory military service and suspects of common crimes. In addition, many women were sexually assaulted; this is a less documented form of torture. Our analysis uncovered that 84 percent of the cases were for political reasons and that 13 percent were for common crime. At the same time 85 percent of the victims were men and 15% women.

Who was responsible for these abuses? The Peruvian National Police was top on the list with 62 percent, followed by the Armed Forces with 35 percent of the cases.

Many factors have made torture a general practice including an institutionalized culture of violence accepted by many Peruvian citizens, the racism suffered by some ethnic groups, and a police force that lacked resources to carry out professional investigations. Moreover, there are not enough civil controls to monitor police performance. In addition to this, when we were doing the report, different parts of the country were under a state of emergency which restricted civil rights. Today, there are still problems with the judiciary system and the military system, which continue to deny access to legal representation and adequate medical reporting.

Since 2000, Peru is living in something that we call "a Democratic Spring," and this moment has brought to us important political and social advances. Signs of the new times and the effort for a recovery of institutionalized democracy, the essential basis for the observance of human rights, are the subscription to and ratification of international treaties, including the statutes of the International Criminal Court and the recently created Truth Commission. However, the NHRC, presented in April its 2001 Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights. In this report, we denounced the continued existence of torture and the frequent and massive human rights violations throughout Peru, mainly in rural areas. We also reported that during the transitional government of Valentin Paniagua and so far with Alejandro Toledo's government, we haven't seen the political will to fight against torture.

Goals

The goals of our campaign were to:

• Decrease the levels of torture through registering and denouncing cases of torture and through recruiting professionals, authorities and common citizens to become actively involved in bringing an end to this problem.
• Utilize national and international legal mechanisms, as well as educational and promoting mechanisms that seek sanction and prevention of torture.
• Develop mechanisms of compensation for victims of torture through the State and the National Human Rights Coordination and to increase the humanitarian help provided by the NHRC.
• Draw the attention of different social sectors and of the State to promote adequate protection and education concerning specific issues such as violence against women, torture and ill treatment during military service, and conditions in prison.

Strategies

Throughout the campaign we had different intervention strategies. First, legal intervention, through which every single organization has continued registering, advising, and defending cases. We also strengthened our training programs on international and national laws against torture. The training was given to lawyers and justice operators — including judges, prosecutors, police, and medical specialists from the public ministry.

Second, in the international field we sent two reports to the UN Commission Against Torture, which visited Peru in 1998. Also, with the collaboration of international human rights organizations, we sought assistance in some "urgent actions" in torture cases.

Third, as part of the campaign, we developed legal and educational training in what we called "sub-campaigns." These sub-campaigns focused on conditions in prisons, torture and ill treatment during the military service, and violence against women.

Fourth, and in conjunction with all the other strategies, we worked through our Center for Psychosocial Services, which addresses the needs of torture victims and their relatives. This Center has 25 psychotherapists and mental health professionals specializing in working with victims of violence.

Finally, but no less important, was the work done to promote the creation of Torture-Free Districts. A Torture-Free District is a geographic circumscription — a district, village, or city — where the civil society and the local government sign a written agreement seeking to promote and ensure civilian controls and public accountability. This strategy focused on the local level, working with local governments and community-based organizations. The objectives were to empower citizens in demanding that public officials observe their basic human rights.

During the creation of a Torture-Free District, written agreements are signed between local authorities and the people; this becomes the weapon by which public awareness is generated. Furthermore, the centerpiece of the agreement is its action plan that gives people the leverage to demand accountability.

Through this initiative we sought to contribute to the strengthening of democracy by incorporating local governments and organizations in the common cause of struggle against torture. It is the right of every single Peruvian to live without the shadow of torture, and it is through public awareness and active participation that we can ensure a country free of torture.

Communications Strategy

All of our interventions had a framework of a common communications strategy. This strategy had four main objectives:

1. To create public awareness and reaction against torture.
2. To promote community organization by providing tools and strategies on denouncing torture, tactics of prevention and information.
3. To create a preventative awareness about torture among members of the police forces.
4. To develop a new image and perception about human rights that is closer to its universal and holistic nature.

The primary targets in this campaign were men and women between 18 and 50 years old, mainly from the middle and lower socioeconomic class and leaders from human rights organizations and other social organizations.

The second targets were members of the armed forces and police.

The Message Strategy

The message strategy of the campaign focused on creating a new pedagogic concept about torture using easily understandable examples such as describing forms of torture that are not always associated with this problem. In this way, the organization not only creates awareness but also tries to broaden the definition of torture. It also called for positive values to prevent torture and to work towards a torture-free society.

To carry out the campaign, we created educational material that could be adapted for different communication needs. Moreover, we personalized the message for different audiences.

Who Was Involved in This Campaign?

All the organizational members of the NHRC were involved in every phase of the campaign process. Simultaneously, they were working with local community based organizations and other key sectors, such as NGO's, religious communities, universities, schools, unions and youth organizations, among others.

We also worked with authorities at the local and national level, the ombudsman's office, mayors, judges, prosecutors, and members of the police and armed forces.

What Did I Learn from This Experience?

In this part of the paper I will try to reflect about what I think were the different weaknesses and strengths of the campaign process. This reflection doesn't respond to any kind of institutional evaluation about the campaign, whose future is still in debate inside the NHRC.

I will take the opportunity to challenge myself as an individual involved in this process and will bring into the discussion some comments and lessons learned from my communications perspective and approach.

Reflection of a Local Will

In 1997, the NHRC held its General Assembly; after 4 days of meetings the new human rights agenda for the next two years was elaborated. At that moment, the plenary decided to carry out two national campaigns: Universal Declaration of Human Rights 50th Anniversary in 1998, and from 1999 to 2001, a Campaign Against Torture.

This decision addressedthe concern of different local organizations that were reporting an increase of torture cases in their communities. At that time the NHRC had gathered the necessary data for public support of the campaigns.

In late 1998, when the communication strategy was elaborated, the NHRC's Executive Secretary (ES) held a large consultation process among human rights activists (national and international), victims of torture, specialists in the issue of torture, and social communicators regarding the focus and tone of the campaign. Important resources for this analysis were the positive and negatives outcomes of the campaign at the time. Thus, the most important questions were how to translate the concepts to be used in tools for dissemination of our message, and how these instruments could be adapted in different realities. It is important to remember that Peru is a country with many ethnic groups.

The decision to launch a campaign and how it was conceived, as well as other political positions taken by my organization, in the last years always surprised me. There are substantial differences among local, regional and national organizations, in terms of access to economic support, experience in the field, management of resources, etc. I observed a common and democratic agreement about the orientation of the campaign. In my point of view, this is one of the dynamics that we can export to other national and international coalition initiatives.

Thinking about the Strategies: Changing Perceptions

The strategies used included an interdisciplinary approach to the issue of torture, and, therefore, a new opportunity to strengthen different levels of advocacy normally developed by human rights organizations. The challenge was how to articulate and mobilize all of these resources. In this reflection, the question of how to talk about torture in our political context came up again.

"Leftist," "Radical," "Defender of terrorists." All of these adjectives and judgments were associated with human rights organizations. On the one hand, as I mentioned at the beginning, that was a result of the political environment and a systematic campaign of the Fujimori regime which sought to discredit the human rights work. On the other hand our strategy at the beginning was to denounce specific cases of torture rather than questioning the legitimacy of the regime. Thus, we were considered radicals because we were trying to disturb an "economically stable" and "recently pacified" country.

Those perceptions about our work and the harsh concepts and image of torture forced us to look for a positive way to tackle the issue. So the campaign's sound bite was: "Let's live without Torture, Peruvians don't want torture."

The campaign challenged our capacity to deal with this issue. The main strategy of the campaign was to involve different sectors, including authorities, as well as to change public opinion concerning torture and human rights work.

But this intention wasn't enough. The NHRC had to face a political context that changed the campaign's destiny.

The Movement and the Fall of the Regime

The human rights movement played a crucial role in the fall of the Fujimori regime, which marked the beginning of the present democratic transition.

Since 1992, the NHRC has been denouncing the government for unconstitutionalism and authoritarianism and as a violator of human rights. At the end of 1999 (some months after the Campaign was launched), when the presidential election campaign began, we started to release information about systematic violations of international electoral standards. At the same time the government, knowing that the Inter American Court was close to reaching a decision against them, decided to withdraw from the binding competence of the Court. This action put the rights of citizens to present before the Court cases against the State in the middle of the debate. The opportune reaction of the NHRC mobilized more than 400 organizations that signed a statement criticizing the government. During this period, it was necessary for us to do something important: to ensure the survival of the human rights movement.

The rapidly changing political environment included 4 general elections in two years. Within this context, the NHRC contributed at different levels:

1. as a credible source of electoral information and denunciations about the regime's nature and the irregularities in the electoral process;
2. as a generator of citizenship mobilization with a national presence that eventually was decisive;
3. as a generator of international pressure, before governments, international organizations and human rights protection systems;
4. ensuring that electoral observers could accomplish their important role;
5. promoting the coordination and dialogue of different political forces — between political parties, and among these and others sectors (church, civil society, etc);
6. as a channel for participation of other sectors such as workers, women, regional fronts, and development NGO's;
7. promoting alternative communication networks as a response to official media control;
8. as a defense of the human rights agenda;
9. involvement in operative issues for particular needs such as civil rights observation, including "yellow vest" during the "Cuatro Suyos March" and;
10. participation in the Organizations of American State (OAS) roundtable dialogue.

How did This Affect the Campaigns?

The Campaign was totally affected. Obviously, the decision was to engage every organization and to garner all our resources and efforts in denouncing the regime.

I still wonder why we didn't officially decide to finish the campaign. Or why we didn't take a break since the political context demonstrated to us that it wasn't the right time to carry out this endeavor.

That was an overwhelming period for most of our organizations. They couldn't uphold the campaign as we expected. However, the NHRC had to choose their battles, and that decision increased the legitimacy of the movement in this transitional moment.

I believe the process was incomplete and that, therefore, the outcomes of this experience were unsuccessful. From my perspective, the obstacles in the decision making process can weaken the capacity building and empowerment of the organizations. It's so difficult to work in parallel national campaigns because, in fact, one of them is always sacrificed. And I'm not saying that this was a bad resolution — that is, to concentrate our capacity in fighting against a government that was extremely corrupt and a violator of human rights. But, what I would have liked to see was a process with order, which could have saved us energy and resources.

One of the biggest questions was about financial support and our commitment to foundations and cooperation agencies in developing the campaign. Were there difficulties in trying to keep their support without divorcing their thematic interest from the social and political reality in Peru? I think there was a conflict, but we didn't take very much time to think about it. I believe that was one of the reasons we didn't officially hold up or take a break in the process. However sometimes with their consent we could support some activities of the political crisis.

In addition, it would be helpful to reflect on the sustainability of the process and the mechanisms used for such endeavors. We must also consider linking with initiatives on accountability issues on local and national levels.

In my opinion the different campaigns launched by the NHRC have been exercises for improving the institutional development of the human rights movement on two levels: 1) an internal level, that allows us to work as a coalition, producing and implementing a common view about common concerns, using common messages that can be adapted in particular realities and areas of work and; 2) the external level, which is useful because it allows the NHRC to introduce into the public agenda the necessary attention to human rights issues, sending clear messages about problems and solutions.

At present, the human rights organizations are also challenged by difficulties of the new human rights agenda. It presents a necessary process of reflection on the Truth Commission process, but also includes thinking about the future. The expectations for the future are to continue to work on the local, national and international levels, integrating economic, social, and cultural rights concerns.

Even if there is not an evaluation of the campaign, I can anticipate the following positive outcomes:

• All the organizations are still reporting cases of torture.
• There are an important number of cases being defended in the Judiciary. We used the new penal legislation about torture with which the first case under the system was won.
• With the campaign, we used the Inter American Commission and Court and tried to hold the State accountable for specific cases.
• We produced reports that were presented in the UN Committee Against Torture.
• The debate linking torture and other human rights violations, such as violence against women, was introduced into the national agenda.
• The Executive Secretary and some of the local and national organizations developed a relationship with police forces, judges, prosecutors, doctors, etc, in terms of education and training.
• There are more sectors of the civil society engaged in this theme (such feminist and child organizations, churches, universities, community based organizations, etc).

SOURCE: Copyright © 2002 Center for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University. This article may be republished without prior permission as long as proper credit to the Center is given. The author wishes to note that this document represents her own personal reflections, and does not necessarily reflect the official point of view of her institution.