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The War for Diamonds and the Response of Civil Society: The Sierra Leone Case Study   Imprimir  E-Mail 
Escrito por Abu Brima for the Center for the Study of Human Rights  

An activist reflects on the critical role civil society has played in ending Sierra Leone's long and brutal civil war, which was fueled mainly by diamonds.

The Sierra Leone Context

Sierra Leone borders Liberia to the southeast, the Republic of Guinea to the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to the West. It is about 71,740 sq. km in size and has a population of about 5,426,618 (July 2001 estimate)[1] Since it gained its independence in 1961 from England, the country has gone through series of civilian and military governments with gross marginalisation of the populace and exploitation of the economic base resulting in a general decline in life and status. In spite of its rich mineral (Diamonds, Gold, Bauxite, Rutile, Iron, Ore etc.) and natural resource base (including forests, rich soils, fisheries and beaches), Sierra Leone today is the poorest country in the world and is still struggling to overcome the legacies of one of the cruelest wars in the history of Africa.

In this paper I seek to reflect on the critical role civil society has played in ending Sierra Leone's long and brutal civil war fuelled mainly by diamonds. The eleven years of protracted conflict forced about half a million Sierra Leoneans to flee the country, turning them into Africa's largest refugee population[2]. At least 75,000 Sierra Leoneans lost their lives, more than 10,000 had their limbs mercilessly chopped off, over 5,000 children (child soldiers) fought alongside adults[3], there were abductions of up to 20,000 between 1991-1999[4], and more than 3,000 communities were completely destroyed. A recent report by Physicians for Human Rights entitled War Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone (January 2002) revealed that in addition to the practice of the chopping off of limbs and other body parts of men, women and even infants, there are reports of pregnant women disemboweled, and women and children raped and forced to become sex slaves[5].

The complex humanitarian situation, a product of the war, exacerbated the already grim quality of life experienced. Today, Sierra Leone is the least developed country in the world, according to the United Nations Human Development Index[6]. A Sierra Leonean's life expectancy of 38.3 years is the lowest in the world, and the under-five mortality rate is the highest in the world. Sixty percent of the adults are illiterate, 36% do not have access to health care, 34% do not have access to clean water, and for the majority of the people in the country, life is consumed by the challenge of survival, which is threatened by violence, disease and malnutrition.

The war, which broke out in 1991, is a complex and brutal conflict that has its roots in at least three decades of misrule, the civil war in neighbouring Liberia, and a long standing resentment among the poor people, especially of the rural interior. Even more disturbing is the role of diamonds in the conflict. According to Joseph Melrose, former U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone, "the fact that diamonds, as well as other resources, have been used both to fuel and fund conflicts in Africa now generally accepted as fact." Ambassador Melrose made this point to the Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee on the role of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)[7] rebels in using diamonds as a currency for the brutal war in Sierra Leone. So, it is common knowledge world wide that diamonds were the main fuel and reason for the continuation of the war.


Diamonds and the War

The diamonds business has been an integral issue throughout the conflict. While Kimberlite (volcanic pipe reserves) do exist, the diamonds business relies on the mining of alluvial deposits located in the eastern part of the country which was largely under RUF control from 1994 to 1996 and from late 1998 to end of the war in January 2002. The diamond industry has been a highly risky and exploitative one. Long dominated by De Beers, the sector has been progressively 'indigenised' through a popular take-over, first by illegal miners and since 1956 by the Alluvial Mining Scheme authorizing mining and buying by Sierra Leoneans. The basic political economy of the artisanal sector rests on the attraction of a gamble: that working as a slave, one can get rich overnight. Getting rich quick is the engine of the trade and somewhat of the resulting war and poverty in Sierra Leone. This gamble is mostly attractive for penniless young men and destitute families sending their boys as porters. But this attraction also goes all the way to the top of the social hierarchy and even, arguably, to regional leaders and foreign investors. The occasional 'Big Winning' (sizeable diamond) has indeed changed the destiny of a few diggers. But most of them accept to receive only two cups of rice and 10 cents (US) for a day of work in the hope of getting a share of the profits. Yet, diamond fields are now generally exhausted, and the profits are small with the sale of diamonds often barely covering expenses unless previously untouched areas are exploited (e.g. Koidu town itself). Furthermore, the vast majority of the profits accrue to the supporter and mining license holder (capital providers consisting of Lebanese, other West African Nationals and very few relatively wealthy Sierra Leoneans, including officials), the land owner (traditional chiefs), and the dealer (predominantly Lebanese with mostly regional migrants acting as local agents) — as well as to officials who are allegedly bribed.

Easy to dig clandestinely with the approval of local chiefs and officials, and easy to smuggle to transit countries (Gambia, Guinea, Liberia) and international markets (Belgium and Israel, but also Lebanon, Thailand and Hong Kong), artisanal diamonds are not easily taxed by the Government. Little official rent is collected from mining, dealing, and exporting licenses, much less the 3% export tax.

On the other hand, the sector is at the mercy of ruthless armed groups. The history of links between the rebellion and the estimated income accrued by the RUF are not well known. It can be estimated that the RUF and its business associates probably earned the greater share of between US$25 and 125 million annual turn-over up to the end of 1999. Most sources trace the significance of diamonds for the RUF to 1994, when it concentrated a successful military offensive in the main mining centers, including rutile and bauxite mines. This 'economic agenda' probably relates to Charles Taylor's[8] shift from sponsoring the RUF for political reasons to benefiting from its capacity to control diamond fields. Belgium-registered imports of diamonds from Liberia increased threefold from the period 1991-4 and the period 1995-8.[9]

Yet, very early on, the RUF made use of the diamond business in several ways:

  • The level of corruption and social exploitation in the diamonds sector provided both a motivation and a subject of propaganda for the movement to recruit among marginalized youths, but also competing local authorities;
  • Diamonds provided the movement with a highly valuable commodity that is easily extracted through artisanal digging in most of the eastern part of the country and transported as well as exchanged for money or goods;
  • Diamond extraction and trading facilitated strategic stand-offs and mutually beneficial deals with army units eager to dig for diamonds rather than fighting;
  • The perspective of taking stakes in Sierra Leone's diamond sector probably incited Charles Taylor and possibly Blaise Compaore[10] to support the movement;

RUF attacks on mining centres were not only about collecting revenues — by looting stockpiles of diamonds and gravel as well as equipment and setting its own mining operations — but also sought to deprive the government of its key source of (informal) revenue. During its first take over of Kono, a major diamond production Centre, in September 1992, the RUF sacked the town and destroyed its industrial plant.

The influence of diamonds on the war and the suffering of many Sierra Leoneans has not only been played out through the abuses of RUF fighters. Numerous other armed groups used violence and the context and pretext of war to take control over diamond areas, expel or enslave civilians, or loot gravel pits.

Since the onset of the war, diamonds have been integrated in its political economy. Regulatory attempts by the government, local communities, and foreign powers have included military force (army, foreign private forces, and local defense units), blanket diamond export sanctions, certification schemes (domestic and global), and secondary sanctions against Liberia. So far, the nature of the sector has prevented any successful regulation especially at community level. The peace enforced by a massive UN deployment coupled with internal pressure on the RUF as well as sanctions (sale of Liberian diamonds and travel ban on officials of Liberian government) have helped to provide a seeming end to conflict diamonds as the RUF demobilized and is reintegrating into society.


The Campaign for Just Mining

Civil Society Response

The story of the long walk to peace by the Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) through the Campaign for Just Mining under the auspices of the civil society Movement of Sierra Leone (CSM-SL) started with the launching in Freetown of the report, The Heart of the Matter-Sierra Leone Diamonds & Human Security published in January 2000 by Partnership Africa Canada. This report, which became the entry point into the campaign, was very clear about the critical part the role diamonds played in facilitating brutality on the civilian population in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. The importance of the issue lies in the fact that the human tragedy in these countries is almost exclusively derived from diamonds, making it unbelievable that the only effects on the citizens of the countries where these diamonds are mined have been terror, butchery, murder, dismemberment and poverty. Instead of using mineral resources for development, they were used to finance the war, robbing generations (present and future), and putting Sierra Leone last on the Human Development Index.


Purpose of the Campaign

The Campaign aimed at helping to ensure that the Sierra Leone diamond industry operated legally, openly and for the benefit of Sierra Leoneans, and that it becomes an asset for, rather than a detriment to, peaceful long-term development. It aimed at contributing to the promotion of just mining policies and practices in Sierra Leone. Its goal was to eliminate the trade in conflict diamonds, which has fuelled the conflict in Sierra Leone over the past eleven years and through that, to lay the foundation for a durable and sustainable peace.

The project provided a space for civil society involvement in the monitoring, management and development of equitable mining policies and practices. In the past, mining was the preserve of government and a few individuals, mainly foreign nationals. The involvement of civil society in the mining sector is new in Sierra Leone — the Network Movement for Justice and Development, through the Campaign for Just Mining, has had to develop new ways of programming and strategizing.

First, the establishment of Mining Task Forces (at the national, provincial and more recently at the district levels) allows for participatory structures for education, mobilization and action on mining issues. The Task Forces were voluntarily established starting with the National Task Force on the day of the of the national seminar to launch "The Heart of the MatterΦ." comprising human rights groups, environmental organizations, academic institutions, bar associations, youth groups, students unions, theatre groups, nurses groups, women's groups, community development organizations and individual activists . The National Task Force was charged with the responsibility to:

  • Be accountable to the civil society movement of Sierra Leone through NMJD
  • Steer the Campaign for Just Mining in Sierra Leone
  • Seek consensus from the Sierra Leone public on mining in Sierra Leone
  • Ensure research and documentation on mining in Sierra Leone
  • Share research findings with the Sierra Leone public, strategic allies and the international community
  • Ensure on-going education on the mining situation in Sierra Leone
  • Solicit moral/material support for the campaign on mining
  • Ensure the creation of community, district and provincial task forces on just mining
  • Prepare documentation on the activities undertaken by the task force
  • Develop the necessary structures/systems that will facilitate the work of the task force and ensure the campaign goes on unhindered until the overall goal is achieved

Steered by NMJD, the National Task Force developed a very comprehensive strategic plan of action for two years with the approach of mobilizing and organizing allies, sensitizing those who are indifferent and confronting those who are antagonistic to the goals of the Campaign.


Campaign Approach

In the analysis of the issues at stake, many actors/protagonists were identified including, the rebels, mining companies, neighbouring countries interested in the minerals, some government officials, some civil servants, fighting forces, some Lebanese people and others from outside of Sierra Leone. All of these were making a profit from the diamonds at the expense of the poor majority. To deal with this situation and reverse the process by empowering the people and making them owners and beneficiaries of their God-given endowment, we employed the use of the "3 Cs Approach" (Cooperate, Campaign, and Confront) as an advocacy tool. The 3Cs are premised on the fact there is need to address the power imbalance in society to bring about change. In this situation, the poor, exploited and marginalized needed to be sensitized, organized and empowered to take responsibility to effect change at what ever cost.

Cooperate: We had to identify all those who agree, are in sympathy and identified themselves with the goals of the Campaign such as individuals, NGOs, civil society groups, communities, politicians, traditional chiefs, researchers and the like. These became our first targets to ally and collaborate with, both organizationally and on an individual basis. This led to the formation of Task Forces (coalitions of civil society groups) all over the country.

Campaign: The second category of people identified included those who are on the fence, not knowing that they stand to benefit tremendously from the outcome of the campaign or who are afraid of and are not sure of the consequences of the outcome of the campaign. These are the apathetic ones needing to be sensitized, educated and lobbied to bring on board the Campaign train.

Confront: Those who are opposed to the Campaign ideology and who are seriously affected if the status quo changes. These people are usually those who were the beneficiaries of the present situation and whose survival is threatened by the Campaign. These are the most powerful politically and economically who needed to be confronted in many different ways to get them to see reason to abandon their onslaught on the country.

The 3 C process was implemented through:

Education/Sensitization: Creating awareness on mining issues in Sierra Leone to generate public & popular debate and input about the mining policy of Sierra Leone and the campaign for fair international trade in Sierra Leone's minerals. The public included both the Sierra Leonean and the international community. Education took the form of regular newsletter publicity in "The Network" newsletter and "Other Facets," preparation of a Fact Sheet on Mining, TV/radio programmes and training workshops and debates.

Consultations: Creating public awareness and understanding of what is involved in the development and monitoring of national mining policies, with an emphasis on improved environmental management of mining operations and on the development and monitoring of investment codes. This happened through symposia, community sensitization, regional and national consultative conferences comprising all sectors of society.

Research and Documentation: Archiving and publicizing practices (or, rather, malpractices) in the mining industries of Sierra Leone and promoting positive and developmentally sound change. Critical to this process here is the institution of another layer of coalition comprising Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD), Search for Common Ground, Sierra Leone Indigenous Miners Movement (SLIMM) and Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). This coalition worked on ensuring that communities benefited from mining done within their borders.

Through the lobbying efforts of the Campaign for Just Mining and its partners, the government of Sierra Leone established the Community Development Fund, based on 0.75% of the 3% export tax paid to the government for the sale of diamonds. The first disbursement of the Community Development Fund has been paid out to communities, based on the number of current mining licenses held in the community. The Ministry of Mineral Resources was lobbied to have funds released only when there were participatory, transparent, and accountable structures in place in communities to decide on how the funds should be used. As a result of lobbying by the CJM, the Ministry of Mineral Resources has also agreed to release funds to the Department of the Environment for mine-site rehabilitation. This is a percentage of the royalty fees that are to be returned to community affected by mining activities. The availability of these funds was announced during a meeting of the Multi-stakeholders Group in late October. Members of the CJM will be approaching the Department of the Environment with environmental rehabilitation project proposals (e.g. Friends of the Earth Sierra Leone, Green Scenery).

Networking and International Alliances: Expanding and strengthening strategic alliances and networking on the mining campaign with other institutions and organization both inside the country and internationally. The collaboration with Partnership Africa Canada, the International Peace Information Service, Global Witness and others afforded our participation in the Kimberley Process, which has led to the development of the Global Certification process for Rough Diamonds.


Outcomes of the Campaign

The Campaign for Just Mining (CJM) was launched to create a wider body of knowledge on the issue of conflict diamonds and to create a coalition of activists/NGOs (national and international) who can struggle/search together for lasting solutions to diamond?related conflict. In Sierra Leone it has offered policy alternatives to the governments with the aim to establish a developmentally sound environment for diamond production and trade in the country.

The Campaign has empowered civil society organizations in Sierra Leone to work for peace, justice and development. It provided a space for civil society involvement in the monitoring, management and development of equitable mining policies and practices. Through the establishment of Mining Task Forces at the regional and national levels, the creation of a Multi-stakeholders Group and the coalition on Community Development Funds (CDF) there is increased opportunity for mining-affected communities to become aware of their rights and demand increased direct benefit from mining activities in their communities.

In the course of the campaign it became obvious that by the complexity of the diamond trade, the Sierra Leone conflict could not be totally handled without also dealing with the links between Sierra Leone and other West African countries, particularly Liberia, Guinea and Burkina Faso. With the armed incursions into Guinea from Sierra Leone and Liberia late last year, leading to the death of hundreds of people including UN officials working in refugee camps, Guinea unfortunately could become the next humanitarian crisis in the region. That crisis was not — and in any case cannot — be treated in isolation; it is merely a manifestation of a broader regional ailment — the expansion of a devastating political economy of violence which has its base in Liberia. This created an avenue for the Civil Societies of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea to get organized and start working on a sub-regional approach to the conflict, peace and security in the Mano River Union.

Through on going monitoring of mining practices, CJM and CDF coalition found out that mining officials were charging two to three times the stated rate for a mining license. Although the government initially denied that their officials were overcharging, subsequent investigation by the government showed this to be the case. The government ran paid announcements on the radio, stating the correct fee for a mining license. License holders are now being charged the published fee for a license.

The establishment of the Community Development Fund based on 0.75% of the 3% export tax that the government gets for the sale of diamonds for the development of mining communities is a welcome outcome of the campaign. The first tranche of the Community Development Fund has been paid out to communities, based on the number of current mining licenses held in the community. The Ministry of Mineral Resources, CJM and its partners are now working on modalities/mechanisms to establish and ensure participatory/transparent/accountable structures in communities to decide on how the funds should be used. The Ministry of Mineral Resources has also agreed to release funds to the Department of the Environment for mine-site rehabilitation. This is a percentage of the royalty fees that are to be returned to communities affected by mining activities. The availability of these funds was announced during a meeting of the Multi-stakeholders Group in late October. Members of the CJM will be approaching the Department of the Environment with environmental rehabilitation project proposals (e.g. Friends of the Earth Sierra Leone, Green Scenery and others.).

The research on the impact of mining on communities allowed stakeholders an opportunity to relate their experiences on mining activities and offer solutions to the problems they face. The research also exposed Task Force members to tools of gathering information/research techniques and the stark reality of mining communities.

In collaboration with our partners in Canada and Europe, an International Advisory Committee with representatives from non-governmental organizations and diamond industry in Canada, the USA, Europe and Africa has been established to review progress on the project, to provide feedback on publications, to serve a monitoring and evaluative function and to assist with advice and support for individual researchers and project partners.

The most remarkable success of this campaign is the extensive network of organizations involved both at the international and at the national level. The Campaign for Just Mining is part of the international network of organizations — including Partnership Africa Canada, Global Witness, Oxfam International, etc. — working to end the trade of conflict diamonds.. Through the efforts of this international network of organizations, the world has taken actions which have contributed to peace in Sierra Leone — the imposition of sanctions against Liberia, the requirement for a Certificate of Origin for diamonds exported from Sierra Leone, and an increased number of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. There has been increased world attention to the question of conflict diamonds and the devastation in Sierra Leone. The world has taken action, and peace is starting to take hold in Sierra Leone. The collaborative support from Third World Network (TWN) Africa Regional Secretariat in Ghana is noteworthy.

At the national level, the broad range of organizations involved with the Task Forces and Multi-Stakeholders group means that the Campaign for Just Mining (CJM) is addressing the issue of mining from a number of perspectives (youth, children, women, workers, environmental, human rights) and that civil society organizations are working together with traditional leaders, government agencies and community-based organizations to analyze issues and develop strategies (i.e. that this isn't a campaign of a small group which can be easily ignored). Because of the Task Force structure, there is a multiplier effect — members of the Task Force take information from meetings/training sessions back to the organizations and communities of which they are members and, in some instances, have set up Just Mining Working Groups at the community level to monitor mining practices, educate the community, and plan environmental rehabilitation activities.

At the start of the campaign (in 2000), the RUF was active throughout the country, which resulted in the key people involved in the Campaign for Just Mining feeling exposed and vulnerable. By creating a broad coalition of groups involved with the campaign (both international and national), they reduced their exposure and sense of vulnerability. There is still some sense of vulnerability; although personal security is not an issue now, it could become an issue if and when the Campaign questions the activities of mining companies (e.g. on the environmental impact of rutile mining). Members of the campaign recognize that working to change legislation can be sensitive, and they are unsure how people will continue to sustain their participation. The Campaign currently has a cordial relationship with government officials, although in a recent meeting, a representative of the Ministry of Mineral Resources indicated mild concern that the Network Movement for Justice and Development keeps criticizing the government's mining policies and offered the advice that they should focus on reforestation projects (rather than criticizing). Members of the Campaign have built a public profile — both within Sierra Leone and internationally — which would mitigate against any threats to personnel involved in the project.

The Campaign for Just Mining has been effective in raising awareness within the general populace and in mining communities in particular about the impact of mining on communities, about the rights and benefits that can be derived from mining activities, and about the negative impact of conflict diamonds, smuggling and non-licensed mining on the country's development.


Lessons, Challenges, and Recommendations

In May 2000, once the general public in Sierra Leone knew that the diamond factor was the main stumbling block to the peace process, civil society, in collaboration with the Parliament, demonstrated against the RUF, which led to the arrest of Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, and many of his commanders. This brought to light further truth about the diamond factor and rallied the international community firmly behind Sierra Leone leading to the improvement in the UN Peace Keeping Force, the robust role of the British Government and the increased commitment of the international community. The Abuja Peace Accord and the various tripartite meetings that finally saw the completion of disarmament are results of the people's resolve after the May 8th Freetown demonstration and increased confidence in the peace process. As the way to peace became clearer, the political scene became more promising with more political parties registering. A National Consultative Conference on "Peace and Democracy in Sierra Leone — the way forward" was held, which signaled the governance framework of the country, with elections set for May 2002.

Admittedly, a lot has been attained in the two years of the campaign, but the difficulties faced and the lessons learned pose serious challenges for future control, management and trade in diamonds as it directly affects peace, governance, security and stability. Some of the challenges on the journey ahead would be:

The mining policies of Sierra Leone need to be radically reformed to reflect local and indigenous ownership, with a review of leases, participatory and depoliticized decision making, corporate responsibility, beneficiation schemes for communities and miners, the cooperation of key ministries such as the ministries of Mines and Mineral Resources, Environment,

Agriculture & Forestry, the implementation of the Environmental Protection Act, and effective collaboration between the government and civil society working on this issue.

The Campaign for Just Mining itself needs now to be rooted at the most local level in the chiefdoms and communities so that the capacity of the people can be enhanced to understand policies and laws, make demands, negotiate from a position of strength, and lobby and advocate for their rights. In other words, there is need for the establishment of a National Platform of Mining Communities by the Campaign for Just Mining. Strengthening the support base of the Campaign is a critical factor at this stage if sustained advocacy is to lead to the overall attainment of the original goals of the Campaign.

A coalition of civil society movements at the regional level would be an important factor in maintaining and monitoring these questions. As is already known, many of the ECOWAS leaders had conflicts of interest with respect to the war in Sierra Leone. Without a countervailing power or force at the regional level it becomes impossible to lobby, advocate and move

issues further. The new initiative of the Mano River Union Civil Society Movement needs to be nurtured, strengthened and institutionalized to be able to face the challenges of peace, security, good governance and sustainable development in the sub-region. A proactive civil society will be able to give direction to their leadership and enforce compliance to international obligations like the International Human Rights provisions.

The UN Security Council must support, oversee and monitor the role and work of regional groupings. Sanctions and punitive measures need to be imposed on States or their leaders that undermine the security, peace and governance of their neighbours directly or indirectly, e.g. by the use of mercenaries, mineral extraction or trade etc., as was the case with Liberia, Burkina Faso and other countries.

The amount of destruction that took place in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea was only possible with support and collaboration from individuals, companies, agencies and countries involved in the diamond and arms business. Sierra Leone and its people need to be compensated by those countries that allowed their people and companies to commit such acts of terror. The international community should not let them go unpunished. It is now known that the proceeds from the Sierra Leone diamonds were used by terrorists. It became clear that it was only when the diamond issue was handled that the war came to a head. The diamonds trade provided the resources for the machinery of war; this fact proves that Sierra Leone, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo and surely others with similar resource base need adequate protection for their minerals — their extraction, trade and processing. This is a case for the UN Security Council.

The Kimberley Process[11] is nearing conclusion and already we NGOs have raised concerns about the extent to which the decisions can be binding on all effective independent monitoring enforced, transparency & accountability practiced, compliance guarantied and violators punished without delay. The UN must not drag its feet on this as the survival, security and governance of nation states hinges on it. I trust that the powerful nations have learned enough lessons to enable them to see far and to make decisions for the good of all, especially for poor and impoverished mineral producing countries like Sierra Leone. The outcome of the last Kimberley Process in November this year must not be another declaration for decoration but a binding instrument that has the full and unreserved support of the UN, the industry and nations dealing in diamonds.

The Campaign's effort to facilitate the development of appropriate, participatory and all-inclusive structures in mining communities to manage Community Development Funds (which are being used to support local integrated development and peace-building activities) needs to be given more attention. The Campaign, through the Task Forces and Multi-Stakeholders Group, has begun to hold the government accountable for the application of mining laws and are pressuring them to change laws, which do not benefit the population. In these ways, the campaign will have responded more appropriately to the dual level dimension of the current mining situation in Sierra Leone.

With the increased awareness of the impact on mining on communities, people want to take action — whether it's to provide schooling for child miners, to rehabilitate mined-out areas, to address the welfare needs of miners (health, education), or to provide alternative employment opportunities (so youth don't have to resort to mining). The Campaign does not include strategies for how to respond to the issues identified through the research and education programs — these emerging issues are being identified by the Task Force members. The Campaign will need to find ways to respond to the needs being identified.

By undertaking campaigns such as this one, civil society is laying firmly the foundations of democracy, economic development, sustainable peace, corporate accountability, and responsibility in the mining sector. In this way there will be respect, protection, and fulfillment of human rights. We have no choice as Civil society at this time; we must take the lead knowing how governments have often failed the people in the past.


Notes

[1] See CIA World Factbook, Sierra Leone on website, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>. [Return to text]

[2] See BBC News, From Our Own Correspondent: Sierra Leone: Worse than Kosovo, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>. [Return to text]

[3] US Department of State, Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, February 2001; p.9. [Return to text]

[4] US Department of State, Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices> , 2000; p.3. [Return to text]

[5] Physicians for Human Rights, War Related sexual Violence in Sierra Leone, (2002) p.26. [Return to text]

[6] UNDP "Statistical Data: Sierra Leone" pg. 154. [Return to text]

[7] Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone is the Rebel Movement that waged the decade old war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) that has caused so much carnage, wanton destruction and suffering to the people using mainly diamonds as the currency. [Return to text]

[8] Charles Taylor is the President of Liberia that serves as the godfather and supporter of the RUF. It is believed that the war in Sierra Leone is an extension of his war plan to take over the diamond fields of the country and control the sub region. [Return to text]

[9] In 1998, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) figure for Sierra Leone diamonds was 80,000 carats, while the imports from Liberia (with a recorded estimated production capacity of 150,000 carats) was 2.6million carats (as recorded by The Belgian High Council alone). The discrepancy points to the effect of Liberia's active involvement in the war in Sierra Leone. [Return to text]

[10] He is the President of Burkina Faso known to be a close friend and supporter of Charles Taylor of Liberia and has been implicated in the Liberia-Sierra Leone diamond and arms deal by the UN expert report released in 2000. [Return to text]

[11] The Kimberley Process was mandated by the United Nations General Assembly to develop a "simple and workable" international certification system for rough diamonds, creating minimum standards for producing, exporting and importing states, including transparent measures for ensuring compliance. Representatives of governments, the diamond industry and NGOs have met in 9 meetings over the past 2 years — the final meeting in the Kimberley Process is taking place in Botswana at the end of November. NMJD has been the only African NGO to participate in Kimberley Process meetings. Partnership Africa Canada has participated in all meetings and is a member of the Kimberley Process Task Force. [Return to text]

SOURCE: Copyright © 2002 Center for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University. This article may be republished without prior permission as long as proper credit to the Center is given.